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Allen v. Lee
319 F.3d 645 (4th Cir. 2003)
I. Facts
Timothy Lanier Allen ("Allen"), an African-American, was tried for first-
degree murder for the killing of a white police officer. At trial, the prosecution
used eleven of thirteen peremptory challenges against African-American venire
members who were otherwise qualified. The jury, composed of six African-
Americans and six Caucasians, found Allen guilty of first-degree murder and
sentenced him to death.1
At the sentencing phase, the court instructed the jury "that [it] should
'unanimously' find from the evidence whether one or more mitigating circum-
stances were present. ' The jury unanimously found three mitigating circum-
stances, but it also found that those mitigators did not outweigh the aggravating
circumstances; therefore, the jury recommended the death penalty.3 After the
verdict, the court polled each juror by re-reading the jury instructions requiring
unanimity and by asking each juror to affirm the jury's answers.4 The jurors
affirmed the death penalty recommendation and the court imposed the death
sentence.
5
Allen appealed to the Supreme Court of North Carolina ("North Carolina
court'), which found no error in either phase of the trial.6 The United States
Supreme Court vacated Allen's death sentence pursuant to McKqy v. North
Carolina7 and remanded to the North Carolina court because it held that a capital
murder jury instruction that requires unanimity in finding mitigating circum-
stances is unconstitutional.' On remand, the North Carolina court found that
1. Allen v. Lee, 319 F.3d 645, 647 (4th Cir. 2003). The jury at the trial initially was






7. 494 U.S. 433 (1990).
8. Allen, 319 F.3d at 647-48 (citing McKoy v. North Carolina, 494 U.S. 433, 435 (1990)
(holding that capital murder jury instruction that requires unanimity to find mitigating circum-
stances is unconstitutional because it prevents sentencer from considering all mitigating evidence)).
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the unanimity error was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt and reinstated
Allen's death sentence.9 The Supreme Court denied certiorari."
Allen filed a habeas petition and a motion under Rule 59(e) of the Federal
Rules of Civil Procedure in federal district court." The court granted summary
judgment for the State on the habeas petition, denied Allen's Rule 59(e) motion,
and granted a certificate of appealability on six claims.'2 Allen appealed to the
United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit and alleged, inter alia, that:
(1) the short-form indictment was unconstitutional; (2) the State used its peremp-
tory challenges in a racially discriminatory manner; and (3) the jury poll did not
cure the harms caused by the unconstitutional jury instruction. 3
II. Holding
The Fourth Circuit found that: (1) the short-form indictment was constitu-
tional; 4 (2) the North Carolina court's analysis of the peremptory challenges
violated clearly established federal law; 5 and (3) the jury poll did not cure the
unconstitutional instruction. 6 The judgment of the district court was affirmed
in part, reversed in part, vacated, and remanded. 7
111. Anaysis
A. Short-Fonm Indictment
Allen argued that the short-form indictment did not allege each element of
the crime, nor did it allege any aggravating circumstance that supported the death
sentence. 8 The district court denied a certificate of appealability on this issue. 9
9. Id. at 648.
10. Id.
11. Id.; see FED. R. CIV. P. 59(e) (providing that "any motion to alter or amend a judgment
shall be filed no later than 10 days after entry of judgment").
12. Allen, 319 F.3d at 648.
13. Id. Allen appealed three of the claims that received a certificate of appealability and one
claim that was denied a certificate. Id. One of the former claims raised a Brady v. Mayland issue
which will not be further discussed in this note. Id. at 649. Seegeneraly Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S.
83 (1963) (holding that prosecution violates defendant's due process rights when it fails to disclose
to defendant, prior to trial, evidence favorable to accused).
14. Allen, 319 F.3d at 649.
15. Id. at 656.
16. Id. at 657.
17. Id. at 658. One Circuit Judge dissented in the opinion. Id.
18. Id. at 648. Allen argued that the defects made the murder conviction and death sentence
invalid underJones v. United States and Apprendi v. New Jersgy. Id. See general Jones v. United States,
526 U.S. 227 (1999) (finding that federal carjacking statute defined elements for distinct offenses
at sentencing phase); Apprendi v. New Jersey, 530 U.S. 466 (2000) (finding that state's proscribed
sentencing factor acted as functional equivalent of element of greater offense and increased
sentence beyond maximum sentence).
19. Alkn, 319 F.3d at 649.
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The Fourth Circuit first was required to decide whether Allen made a "substan-
tial showing of the denial of a constitutional right" before it could proceed to the
merits of his claim.2" According to the Fourth Circuit, Allen's short-form
indictment did not present "a substantial constitutional question upon which
reasonable jurists could disagree."'" The Fourth Circuit denied a certificate of
appealability on the issue and dismissed the claim.'
B. Radal4-Motivated Peremptory Chalknges
Allen argued that the prosecution's use of its peremptory challenges violated
his Sixth and Fourteenth Amendment rights under Batson v. Kentucky' because
the prosecution used eleven of thirteen peremptory challenges on otherwise
qualified African-American potential jurors.24 The district court granted Allen
a certificate of appealability on this issue, which meant that Allen had "already
made 'a substantial showing of the denial of a constitutional right"' for purposes
of the Fourth Circuit's review.' Thus, the Fourth Circuit could proceed directly
to the substance of Allen's Batson claim and grant habeas corpus relief if it found
that the North Carolina court reached a "decision that was contrary to, or
involved an unreasonable application of, clearly established Federal law, as
determined by the Supreme Court of the United States."26
1. Preservation ofBatson Claim
The Fourth Circuit addressed first whether Allen properly preserved his
Batson objection.27 Before trial, Allen filed a pretrial motion that focused "on the
20. Id. at 648-49 (quoting 28 U.S.C. § 2253(c)(2) (2000) (stating when certificate of
appealability may issue)).
21. Id.; see Hartman v. Lee, 283 F.3d 190, 199 (4th Cit. 2002) (concluding that North
Carolina's short-form indictment was neither contrary to nor unreasonable application of federal
law). For a complete discussion and analysis of Hartman and the use of short-form indictments in
Virginia, see generallyJanice L. Kopec, Case Note, 15 CAP. DEF.J. 197 (2002) (analyzing Hartman
v. Lee, 283 F.3d 190 (4th Cir. 2002)).
22. Alkn, 319 F.3d at 649. The Fourth Circuit's analysis is the proper way to deal with this
issue. See general# Miller-El v. Cockrell, 123 S. Ct. 1029 (2003) (clarifying procedure for determining
whether to grant certificate of appealability).
23. 476 U.S. 79 (1986).
24. Allen, 319 F.3d at 649-50; see Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79, 97 (1986) (stating that
prosecution has burden of showing neutral reason for excluding juror if defendant makes prima
fade showing of exclusion by race).
25. Alkn, 319 F.3d at 649 (quoting Slack v. McDaniel, 529 U.S. 473, 484 (2000)).
26. See 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)(1) (2000) (stating that writ of habeas corpus pursuant to state
court decision can only be granted if state court decision was contrary to or unreasonable applica-
tion of clearly established federal law; part of AEDPA).
27. Allen, 319 F.3d at 650.
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State's history of excluding black jurors."28  At the time, Swain v. Alabama'
governed; that case required the defendant to show that the prosecutor systemat-
ically used peremptory challenges to strike African-American potential jurors
over a period of time. 3 The trial court denied Allen's motion because, pursuant
to Swain, Allen had asked the trial court to consider the prosecution's use of
peremptory challenges "over time" instead of in the specific case before the
court.3
The Fourth Circuit compared Allen's case with the Supreme Court's holding
in Ford v. Georia3  and decisions in other circuits involving the preservation of
Batson claims.3 The Fourth Circuit found that, in those cases, Batson claims were
waived only when the defendant failed to make any challenge under Batson or
Swain.34 The court focused particularly on Justice Souter's statement in Ford
Because Batson did not change the nature of the violation recognized
in Swain, but merely the quantum of proof necessary to substantiate a
particular claim, it follows that a defendant alleging a violation of equal
protection of the law under Swain necessarily states an equal protection
violation subject to proof under the Batson standard of circumstantial
evidence as well.3"
In the Fourth Circuit's opinion, the language in Allen's pretrial motion properly
raised an objection under Swain.36 The court emphasized that defendants are not
required to seek the best remedy, but need only to provide the trial court with the
opportunity to correct the constitutional violation before jury selection is com-
28. Id.
29. 380 U.S. 202 (1965).
30. Swain v. Alabama, 380 U.S. 202,227 (1965). Allen's trial took place before the Supreme
Court decided Batson. Allen, 319 F.3d at 650.
31. Allen, 319 F.3d at 650.
32. 498 U.S. 411 (1991).
33. Allen, 319 F.3d at 650; see Ford v. Georgia, 498 U.S. 411,420 (1991) (finding that pretrial
"Motion to Restrict Racial Use of Peremptory Challenges" was sufficient to preserve Batson issue
even though it did not cite any legal authority).
34. Allen, 319 F.3d at 651; see also McCrory v. Henderson, 82 F.3d 1243, 1249 (2d Cir. 1996)
(holding that defendant's failure to object to prosecution's discriminatory use of peremptory
challenges before conclusion of jury selection waives Batson objection); Cochran v. Herring, 43 F.3d
1404,1409 n.7 (11 th Cir. 1995) (stating that Swain objections properly made in pretrial motions are
considered timely Batson objections); Wilkerson v. Collins, 950 F.2d 1054, 1062-63 (5th Cir. 1992)
(finding that defendant who failed to object to prosecution's peremptory challenges at any point
during trial could not raise Batson objection on appeal).
35. Alkn, 319 F.3d at 650-51 (quoting Ford, 498 U.S. at 420).
36. Id. at 652. Allen suggested a remedy in which he would receive additional peremptory
challenges. Id. The Fourth Circuit suggested that the better remedy would have been to "directly
prohibit the prosecution from using its peremptories in a racially discriminatory manner." Id. The
court stated, however, that the remedy sought was irrelevant to the issue of whether Allen properly
raised a Swain objection. Id.
[Vol. 15:2
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plete in order to preserve a Batson claim.37 Allen's pretrial objection, therefore,
sufficiently preserved his Batson claim.3"
2. The Batson Claim
The Fourth Circuit then considered the substance of Allen's Batson claim.
39
The Fourth Circuit stated that courts conducting Batson hearings must determine
whether the defendant can make a prima facie showing of discrimination in the
prosecutor's use of peremptory challenges.' If the defendant makes a prima
facie showing, the burden shifts to the prosecution to provide a neutral explana-
tion for excluding the juror or jurors at issue.4"
The Fourth Circuit found that the North Carolina court improperly denied
Alen's claim because it did not consider any of Allen's evidence of discrimina-
tion.42 The North Carolina court instead relied only on the fact that a majority
of the seated jury consisted of African-Americans.43 The Fourth Circuit deter-
mined that "[i]n relying on the ratio of black jurors seated to black jurors ten-
dered, the North Carolina Supreme Court has turned the Batson analysis on its
head."'  The Fourth Circuit stated that it is appropriate to consider evidence of
who was seated on the jury, but that courts should also focus on the excluded
members of the venire in conducting a Batson analysis.45
The Fourth Circuit analyzed Allen's evidence of discrimination and found
it compelling.46  Of the venire, 57.5% were Caucasian, 36.3% were African-
American, and 6% were of another race.47 The Fourth Circuit compared these
statistics with the fact that 84.6% of the prosecution's peremptory challenges
were used to exclude African-Americans and found that this disparity was
relevant evidence.4" The court also found that other circumstantial evidence




.40. Id. at 652-53. The Fourth Circuit stated:
[A] court must first determine whether a defendant can show that: (1) the defendant
is a member of a cognable racial roup; (2) the prosecutor used the challenges to
remove members of the defendant s race from the venire; and (3) other facts and
circumstances surrounding the proceeding raise an inference that the prosecutor
discriminated in his or her use of peremptory challenges.
Id. (citing Keel v. French, 162 F.3d 263, 271 (4th Cir. 1998)).
41. Allen, 319 F.3d at 353; Batson, 476 U.S. at 97.
42. Allen, 319 F.3d at 353.
43. Id. (citing State v. Allen, 372 S.E.2d 855, 862 (N.C. 1988)).
44. Id. at 655.
45. Id. at 653.
46. Id.




basis for striking some jurors.49 In particular, the court focused on a Caucasian
woman who stated that she "had known defense counsel 'through the years as
he was growing up' " and who could have been sympathetic to the testimony of
Allen's mother."0 The court compared the prosecution's decision to keep this
juror with the prosecution's decision to strike an African-American woman who
stated that she knew one of the defense attorneys, but that they were not friends
or acquaintances.5" In the Fourth Circuit's opinion, this comparison and the
African-American woman's pro-death penalty views made the decision to keep
the Caucasian juror "particularly suspect."52
The Fourth Circuit emphasized that "a racially biased use of a peremptory
challenge against even a single potential juror violates Batson."53 Although the
State argued that the jury was 58% African-American and that it left seven
African-Americans on the jury without using all of its peremptory challenges, the
Fourth Circuit dismissed the evidence as showing only that "race may not have
been a determinative factor every time an African American juror was called to the
jury box.
'" 54
The Fourth Circuit considered the North Carolina court's juror-counting
test improper because the prosecution has only limited ability to control the
composition of the jury." Instead, the Fourth Circuit stated that the most direct
evidence for evaluating a Batson challenge is found in the excluded juror(s)
because the prosecution possesses total control over the decision of whom to
exclude.56 The Fourth Circuit held that the North Carolina court's test contra-
dicted clearly established federal law as determined by the Supreme Court in
Batson. 7 As a result, the Fourth Circuit remanded the case to the district court
and instructed it either to hold a hearing on the Batson claim or to return the case
49. Id.
50. Id. This juror had read newspaper accounts of the shooting and pretrial activity and was
a mother and grandmother. Id. The Fourth Circuit stated that the possibility existed that this juror
could have been influenced "by her experiences as a mother and grandmother, her exposure to
media accounts of the shooting, as well as the likelihood that she would trust a defense lawyer
whom she had known well since his childhood." Id.
51. Id. at 653-54. This juror stated that she knew defense counsel only in that she knew that
he worked in the area and that she had seen him at the store. Id. The Fourth Circuit stated that
it was unlikely that the prosecution was concerned about this relationship because it was a "tenuous
and casual connection," as opposed to the Caucasian juror's long-term relationship with defense
counsel. Id. at 654.
52. Id. at 653.
53. Allen, 319 F.3d at 654.
54. Id. (emphasis in original); see Batson, 476 U.S. at 95 (stating that single invidiously
discriminatory act by Government is not immunized by absence of discrimination in making other
comparable decisions).
55. Allen, 319 F.3d at 656.
56. Id.
57. Id.; see § 2254(d).
[Vol. 15:2
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to the state trial court on a conditional writ of habeas corpus."5 The Fourth
Circuit instructed that whichever court would conduct the Batson hearing must
consider the facts and circumstances of the challenges to the eleven African-
American jurors along with any other relevant evidence.59
C The Juy Poll
The district court granted a certificate of appealability to Allen's claim that
the jury poll did not cure the unconstitutional jury instruction." The Fourth
Circuit found that the jury poll "neither instructed the jury nor amended an
instruction," and that the poll showed only that each juror followed the unconsti-
tutional instructions in sentencing Allen to death.61 The court stated that the
poll, by itself, could not possibly cure the error.6" The Fourth Circuit stated that
poll responses that are designed to cure a constitutional error must determine
whether each juror considered a mitigating circumstance in reaching his or her
sentencing decision. 3 As a result, the Fourth Circuit vacated Allen's death
sentence and remanded the case to the district court "with instructions to issue
a writ of habeas corpus releasing Allen from his sentence of death" unless North
Carolina conducts re-sentencing proceedings within a reasonable time."
IV. Applicaion in Virginia
The Fourth Circuit's decision lays out a clear framework for the
Batson/Swain objection. It is important to recognize that procedural default
occurs only when the defense completely fails to assert a claim of discriminatory
peremptory challenges by the prosecution before the jury is empaneled. Defense
counsel need not argue the most appropriate remedy; the focus must be primarily
on the timing of the objection.6"
This decision allows defense attorneys more easily to raise Batson claims. If
there is any suspicion of a racially discriminatory intent in the prosecution's
peremptory challenge, defense counsel may object immediately without trying to
determine what the best remedy is. Defense counsel should emphasize that the
court must examine the reasons for excluding the excluded juror and not merely
58. Allen, 319 F.3d at 656.
59. Id.
60. Id. at 657. The district court rejected Allen's claim that the North Carolina court erred
in finding that the jury poll cured the unconstitutional instruction. Id. The district court, however,
granted a certificate of appealability on the issue. Id.
61. Id.
62. Id. The Fourth Circuit added that McKy had yet to be decided at the time of Allen's trial
and thus that the jury poll was not designed to cure the unconstitutional instruction. Id. at 658.
63. Id.
64. Allen, 319 F.3d at 658.
65. See id. at 651-52 (stating that remedy sought is irrelevant when Swain issue is properly
raised to trial court).
20031
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the composition of the actual jury. Defense counsel also can force the court to
compare seated and excluded jurors, presumably to rebut the prosecution's race-
neutral reason. Furthermore, statistical and circumstantial evidence will suffice
to raise a proper Batson claim. Defense counsel must continue to be aware,
however, that a prima facie case must still be met before shifting the burden on
the prosecutor to show a nondiscriminatory reason for the peremptory
challenge.6
V. Condusion
Allen shows that Batson challenges will not easily be denied on procedural
default grounds. Defense counsel is given considerable leeway to raise such
concerns both to the trial court and to an appellate court. Perhaps more impor-
tandy, writs of habeas corpus will be granted if a state court fails to conduct the
proper Batson analysis.
Philip H. Yoon
66. See id. at 652-53 (stating procedures trial court must folow for Batson hearing); Batson, 476
U.S. at 97.
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